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Abstract: This study aims to identify insecurities among youth in Kosovo, utilizing insights from the field
to advance and deepen the concept of human security, capturing the connection between insecurity and
affiliated agency. It also explores attitudes towards police in Kosovo, analysing youth perspectives on
performance, procedural justice and distributive justice. Primary data from semi-structured focus group
discussions with Kosovar youth are used for the analyses. Four main insecurities were identified: (1)
job-related, (2) drug-related, (3) school-related, (4) physical insecurities. Ethnic tensions were a recurrent
crosscutting theme. Attitudes towards police are generally perceived as poor and seem to stem mainly
from a performance and procedural justice perspective. Recommendations for future research and policy
conclude the article.
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1. Introduction
In February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its indepen-
dence from Serbia after the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia had collapsed in 1992 and the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro split after a referendum in 2006.
The declaration came “after years of strained relations be-
tween its Serb and mainly Albanian inhabitants. It has been
recognised by the United States and major European Union
countries, but Serbia, backed by its powerful ally Russia,
refuses to do so, as do most ethnic Serbs inside Kosovo”
[1]. Kosovo has a mixed past, with periods of confrontation
as well as periods of contact and co-operation across ethnic
and religious boundaries [2]. In the 1990s, however, the
ethnical tensions reached a violent peak, which included
ethnical cleansing and other war crimes from both sides,
in the Kosovo War of 1998-1999. Kosovo is now home
to about 2 million citizens, scattered over an area about
one-fourth the size of the Netherlands (10,887 square kilo-
metres).
Still, “in 2011, Kosovo received 19 times more devel-
opmental aid than the average developing country. More-
over, in per capita terms Kosovo received 50 times more
peacekeeping troops and 25 times more funds from the in-
ternational community than Afghanistan did after 2001” ([3],
pp. 20-21). Although this assistance worked out differently in
each country ([4], p. 36), “it has arguably contributed to the
consolidation of hybrid state institutions, the reproduction of
patron–client political relations, and the intensification and
monetization of political marketplaces.” It also clearly shows
the involvement of the international community even more
than ten years after the formal conflict ended. There are var-
ious reasons for this international interest. For the EU, it is in
part related to its proximity to other EU member states: “The
c© 2020 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). librello
partnership between the EU and the Western Balkans is in
the interest of all sides, promoting peace, stability, freedom,
security and justice, prosperity and quality of life” [5]. The
extent in which international assistance reached the local
level and supported local ownership is criticized, especially
for the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) [3,4,6].
Despite the disproportionate amounts of international
aid flowing into Kosovo, little seems to have changed [7]:
macro-level issues such as corruption, nepotism and eth-
nic tensions between the Albanian and Serb populations
in Kosovo still infest the region [8–10].The developmental
lags in Kosovo despite the large amounts of aid are partic-
ularly poignant, as the international community itself has
essentially been sitting in drivers’ seat when it comes to, for
example, the Kosovar police reform and law-enforcement
reform for the most part [4,6,7].
This study takes a micro-level perspective to analyse the
effects of these macro-level issues on the human security
of Kosovo’s youth in particular. By utilizing insights from
the field and capturing the connection between insecurity
and affiliated agency, the concept of human security is ad-
vanced and deepened. This group is not only of particular
interest because it represents the future of Kosovo, it is
also the largest age group within its society: about half the
population is under the age of 25, while approximately 65%
is under 30 years of age [11]. Kosovo is not only Europe’s
youngest state; it also inhabits its youngest population.
The present study strives to give Kosovar youth a voice –
something that is not usually done according to some inter-
viewees, despite the attempts made by e.g. youth councils,
governmental youth action strategies, international actors,
and so on – and is divided into two main parts, guided by
two research questions per part listed below. The first part
addresses insecurities for young Kosovars and the ways in
which they (try to) resolve these issues. In many cases, the
identified insecurities and respective resolutions are related
to the role of and attitudes towards police (ATP) in Kosovo,
which are addressed in the second part of this study. Building
on the study design for ATP of Dirikx, Gelders & Parmentier
[12], both the perceptions and importance of the following
three aspects of police work are addressed: (1) performance,
(2) procedural justice and (3) distributive justice.
Part I
1. What insecurities do young Kosovars have growing
up in post-conflict Kosovo?
2. What resolution mechanisms do young Kosovars em-
ploy to overcome these insecurities, if at all?
Part II
1. What perceptions do Kosovar youth have of the per-
formance, the procedural justice and the distributive
justice of the police in Kosovo?
2. How much importance do Kosovar youth attach to
the performance, procedural justice and distributive
justice of the police in Kosovo?
Primary data from semi-structured focus group discus-
sions with Kosovar youth are used. These focus groups
are mainly explorative in nature for Part I: they aim to distil
the insecurities of young Kosovars and then builds towards
the second theme, based on the initial input from partici-
pants. The themes handled in Part II, on the other hand, are
theoretically embedded in the frameworks described below.
2. Defining (In)security
“Security is an essentially contested concept.” ([13], p. 74).
Depending on the field of interest and the different schools
of thought within a particular field, different definitions of
security and its antonym are used. Generally speaking
– that is, as defined by dictionaries – security is seen as
something along the lines of ‘being free from risk or danger’.
This definition is similar to the notion of human security,
often used in social sciences and referred to in this study
when addressing (in)security for Kosovar youth. However,
the definition of human security, too, is heavily contested
in policy and academic debates. The term human security
gained attention in the 1990s, where the UNDP examined
human security as a dual agenda of “freedom from fear
and freedom from want.” Later, the Commission on Human
Security defined human security as follows [14]: “Human
security means protecting fundamental freedoms [...]. It
means protecting people from critical (severe) and perva-
sive (widespread) threats and situations. [...] It means
creating political, social, environmental, economic, military
and cultural systems that together give people the building
blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”
Two opposing views have developed in the academic
debate: a narrow and a broad understanding of human
security. Those in favour of narrowing the concept empha-
sise the freedom-from-fear aspect, focussing on ([13], p. 76)
“violent threats to individuals, while recognizing that these
are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity
and various forms of socioeconomic and political inequity.”
Advocates of a broader concept of human security, instead,
emphasise on keeping a more holistic approach. They
argue that [15] “once the referent of the security agenda
becomes the individual, it is impossible to disentangle vio-
lent threats to individuals from other issues such as poverty,
environmental degradation, and infectious diseases that di-
rectly impinge on the safety, freedom, and self-realization of
human beings.” Either way, the term signifies an alteration
in security studies, which traditionally focused on security of
the state mainly [15]. Recent research has opted to utilize
insights from the field to advance and deepen the concept
of human security [16], capturing the (sometimes paradox-
ical) connection between insecurity and affiliated agency.
This way, research can “[open] up processes of knowledge
production that allow individual accounts to be constructed,
acknowledged and validated has resulted in a collaborative
understanding of human security”([16], p. 581) . Accord-
ing to the study by Kostovicova, Martin & Bojicic-Dzelilovic,
Kosovars mainly resort to self-reliance, informality and com-
munity solidarity to overcome their insecurities, but cannot
relieve macro-level insecurities posed by a weak state. The
results of this study (see 5.1) show similar resolutions (i.e.
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agency) applied by youth. This study addresses the agency
of (young) individuals in Kosovo by investigating resolution
mechanisms they employ to overcome everyday-life inse-
curities. Moreover, the exploratory nature of the research
with youth posed here, suits the holistic and individual-
oriented understanding of security that the broad concep-
tion of human security offers. The focus group participants
fully embraced a holistic approach of security, discussing
both socioeconomic and physical insecurities, as well as
the interconnections between them.
3. Theoretical Framework on Attitudes towards Police
In part II of this article, ATP of youth are addressed. In
the literature, a variety of terms is used interchangeably
with ‘attitudes towards police’ [12], and is often treated as a
unidimensional concept measuring a general opinion about
the police, also referred to as general support for - or con-
fidence in the police (for example, [17–19]). When ATP is
studied as a multidimensional concept, however, there are
three main perspectives on ATP to be distinguished [12]: (1)
the performance-based perspective, (2) the distributive jus-
tice perspective and (3) the procedural justice perspective.
The performance-based perspective seems most straight-
forward: it argues that “people’s ATP are mainly determined
by their views on how effectively the police control crime. If
people feel that the police are effectively controlling crime,
that they are keeping the neighbourhood safe and that crime
rates are low, their ATP can be expected to be positive.”
([12], p. 193).
The distributive justice perspective emphasizes the im-
portance of a fair distribution of police services across peo-
ple and communities, regardless of their social, cultural,
economic, ethnical or religious background, nor age or gen-
der [12,20].
Finally, the procedural justice perspective argues that
ATP mainly revolve around the fairness in the decision-
making process and way in which authority is exercised
in general [21]. This final perspective can be divided into
four underlying elements affiliated with positive procedural
justice: (1) opportunities for participation, (2) friendliness
and politeness, (3) neutrality and (4) trustworthiness [12,20].
This framework will be used for the analyses of the results
(ad-hoc). It was not used to guide the of focus group dis-
cussions in any way.
4. Material and Methods
In the summer of 2018, nine semi-structured dual-
moderator focus group discussions were conducted [22].
Participants from four out of seven main districts of Kosovo
– Pristina, Prizren, Mitrovica and Ferizaj – were sampled
through convenience and snowball sampling [23], target-
ing youth between 16 and 30 years of age who have not
entered the labour market fully or formally yet [24]. The
Serbian population in Kosovo is difficult to reach, as many
boycott surveys and studies. For this study, fortunately,
one focus group was conducted with Serbian youth too. In
total, 46 participants took part in the focus group discus-
sions. All focus groups were planned with at least seven
participants each; however, some participants did not show
up for their focus group. This thus sometimes resulted in
smaller group sizes, but did not render the discussions any
less informative or vibrant (sometimes, quite the opposite).
The semi-structured focus group discussions covered the
following main themes in line with the research questions
set for this study: (1) insecurities for young Kosovars, (2)
resolution mechanisms and (3) ATP.
It is crucial to conduct focus group discussions in the
participants’ native language so discussions can elapse flu-
ently, especially when interviewing youth. Therefore, young
Albanian-speaking Kosovars, who were trained by the re-
searcher, conducted the interviews in Albanian. A Bosnian
interviewer who speaks Serbian conducted the focus group
with Serbian youth in order to retain a peaceful discus-
sion. The researcher was present during all focus groups
to observe the discussion process. The fact that these in-
terviewers have a background in Kosovo and are young
themselves provided them with an in-depth and sincere
understanding of the participants. It also benefitted the at-
mosphere in which participants were able to speak openly.
The fact that participants, especially in the beginning of the
discussion, sometimes added sentences like “you know that
already” to the interviewer, shows that they are aware of
their background. In prospect, the interviewers were trained
to emphasize the importance of speaking openly throughout
the discussion, also if they thought the interviewer would
know about it already. Both the observing researcher and
the interviewers stressed this as well at the beginning of
each focus group. This approach also helped to “collapse
the distance between the outsider/researcher and those
on the sharp end of insecurity, engaged as partners in the
co-construction of the knowledge of security,” as done in the
study by Kostovicova et al. ([16], p. 581), be it in a different
way.
An interview guide was set up to provide a broad frame
to guide the discussions around these main themes, making
sure none was left out. The guide was only created to keep
the discussions on topic and to initiate discussions; not to
systematically steer them by any theoretical background.
This is also true for the theme on ATP, which is theoretically
embedded into the framework presented above. Here, dis-
cussions were initiated by addressing participants’ relation
with police in general and by relating to the role of police in
the previously identified insecurities in each focus group.
5. Results
5.1. Part I: Insecurities and Resolutions
Four main insecurities were identified in the conducted
focus groups: (1) job-related (including job-related discrim-
ination), (2) drug-related, (3) school-related, (4) physical
insecurities. Ethnic tensions were a recurrent crosscutting
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theme, related to most of the aforementioned insecurities
and addressed at the end.
5.1.1. Job-related insecurities
Kosovo is a so-called transition economy, moving from a
centrally planned economy under Yugoslavian rule into a
market-based economy [25]. The main sectors in the Koso-
var economy include mining, energy, construction, agricul-
ture and the textile industry [26]. In 2019, more than half of
those who are employed work in trade, construction, manu-
facturing and education, according to data from the Kosovo
Agency of Statistics [27].
In eight out of nine focus groups, the discussion started
with concerns about getting a job and the high level of un-
employment (see Figure 1) in combination with the poor
economic situation (see Figure 2). It signifies the harsh
conditions in the Kosovar work-sphere and youth are con-
cerned about it even while still in school or college. Their
concerns are not without good reason: the most recent
statistics show that the overall unemployment rate hovers
around 25% [27,28]. Although unemployment rates have
been higher in recent years, Kosovo still has the highest
unemployment rate in the European area [29,30]. The rates
for youth are even higher: approximately 55% of those
aged between 15 and 24 were unemployed in 2018 [31] -
the year in which the interviews took place. Kosovo ranked
third in (reported) youth unemployment around the world
in 2019 - just behind South Africa and Libya [27,32]. More-
over, the situation is getting worse [33]: “Every year, more
than 30,000 young people enter the job market. Fewer than
8,000 find work.” Youth often face two key disadvantages:
lack of experience and a lack of a professional network
[34,35]. Although the Kosovar government has made com-
batting youth unemployment a policy priority, sustainable
progress is still to be made [35].
The current COVID19 pandemic and its aftermath will
most likely worsen the situation. The impact of the pan-
demic on the labour market is expected to show in the
Kosovo labour force data in the second quarter of 2020,
according to the Kosovo Agency of Statistics. “In Q1 2020
some businesses did not close their activities (Pandemic
start) and the impact on the first quarter was very low [28] .”
A wave of job-losses also emerged during the war and
its aftermath. For example, Kosovo lost most of its largest
export facility: Trepca mine in the North, housing mainly
lead, zinc, silver and a variety of minerals. Only a fraction
of the mines is currently up and running, employing less
than 1400 miners as opposed to some 23 thousand during
its pre-war peak. The mining complex once accounted for
over two-thirds of Kosovo’s gross domestic product, but the
strong ethnical tension between Kosovar Albanians and
Serbs loyal to Belgrade in Mitrovica – as well as the costly
need for repairs [33]- withholds most of Trepca’s facilities
from re-opening [36]. The young Kosovars in the North see
this as a great loss of jobs, associated with the privatization
of the mines and other previously state-owned factories
throughout the country.
Figure 1. Unemployment trends as percentage of total labour force [29].
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Figure 2. GDP per capita in thousands (current US$) [37].
This study identified three main types of job-related inse-
curities for youth: (1) being hired for the wrong reasons, (2)
the difficulty of getting a job in general and (3) the difficulty
of getting a job on a higher level (suiting one’s study field
and level).
First of all, being hired for the wrong reasons seems to
be a somewhat less common (or at least less discussed)
insecurity; partly because getting a job is difficult in the
first place and most participants were not yet employed.
Nonetheless, it marks a poignant insecurity: “I’ve had it per-
sonally, I went to job interviews and that look that you get
from head to toe is simply terrifying.” The girl from Pristina,
who described her experiences with such inappropriate and
unprofessional job interviews, sees this form of harassment
as a part of an ever-present fear for women in particular.
More gender-based insecurities are discussed later (see
5.1.5).
The difficulties surrounding getting a job, let alone on a
higher level, are present for almost all of the participants
and are strongly related to the enduring poor job-market
[27,31] and youth disadvantages in experience and profes-
sional networks [34,35]. The mechanisms that seem to lie
beyond are a variety of power relations deeply rooted in the
Kosovar society. Having family or friends in the respective
company or in high positions in general is necessary to
get a job (nepotism), according to several young Kosovars.
Another controversial way to get a job in Kosovo is by pay-
ing for it (corruption). Either way, doing neither strongly
decreases your chances of getting the job, even if you are
(more) skilled than other job applicants are.
Youth also report cases where “someone was not ac-
cepted [for a job] unless they sent in a picture” or not being
selected for a job because someone looks better. A girl
from Mitrovica, currently working in a call centre as a side
job, sums it up quite concisely: “We have to pay [to get a
job]. We go with our CV but ... maybe there is someone
more beautiful than we are; then she got the [job]! Or she
has family there; she got the [job] too. So if we are just [...]
going with a CV [to look] for a job, we are not going to get
it.”
Sadly, the youth is largely unable to employ effective res-
olutions for these job-related issues other than playing along
(i.e. paying up) and hoping for the best (i.e. being lucky with
family and/or friends in important positions). Attempts of
utilizing the help of job-centres or using word of mouth (to
improve professional network) and taking internships (to im-
prove professional experience) to find job openings do not
often seem to get significant results. In some cases, it was
argued that it can help to look for jobs in branches or cities
(read: Pristina, the capital) with more job openings, but it
cannot overcome the general lack of job opportunities in
Kosovo. To address these macro-level problematics, struc-
tural changes in society need to take place. Many young
Kosovars see emigration into EU states as the resolution
for job-related and financial insecurities. This emphasis on
“getting out” showed from the mass emigration movement
which took place in 2015. “Since we were kids, [...] you
could hear grown-ups talking: ‘There is nothing here, you
have to leave.’ There is this idea integrated that we have to
leave in order to be successful,” a girl from Pristina stated.
70
5.1.2. Job-related Discrimination
Some job-related insecurities are more prominent for spe-
cific sub-groups of the population. “In a place [like Kosovo]
with high unemployment and poverty rates, with a lack of
an adequate social welfare system, as well as a low GDP,
it becomes difficult to define marginalization and to map
certain groups as marginalized. What is more, marginalized
groups [in Kosovo] were not a subject of many studies, and
even when they were, not all groups were covered.” ([38],
p. 103). Focus group participants identified two main char-
acteristics prone to hiring discrimination (apart from youth’
lack of experience and professional network, addressed
previously): (1) political preference and (2) gender. Some
focus groups, notably those held in Prishtina and Prizren,
were particularly dominated by a discussion about political
freedom in Kosovo. Some youth who participated there,
were actively involved in discussion groups and voluntary
work in their community and spoke about their experience
as supporters of oppositional parties. A girl from Prizren de-
scribes political-based inequality as follows: “For example,
someone is a part of a political party and is in opposition,
they will be automatically excluded from the workplace [...].”
This is an indication of the poor environment for critical re-
flection in the Kosovar political spectrum and sometimes
results in physical threats (see 5.1.5). Kosovo passed pro-
gressive anti-discrimination laws in 2004 already [39,40] but
a need for better law enforcement remains when it comes
to political discrimination as well as other forms of discrimi-
nation in the employment sector. While hiring discrimination
based on ethnicity, age and gender has been explored at
least to some extent in Kosovo (for example, [34,38,41]),
research exploring political discrimination remains elusive.
For women, it can be more difficult to get a job, as “a
man will get a job before the girl”, a boy from a village
near Mitrovica stated. The way in which he – probably un-
consciously – worded his statement, shows exactly how
deeply gender-inequalities are embedded into society (i.e.
using ‘man’ and ‘girl’ as opposites, instead of ‘man’ and
‘woman’, or ‘boy’ and ‘girl’). A female participant elaborated
by arguing: “People think that the female gender is more
sensitive and they take things too hard, so they can’t take
the right decision [...].” Gender stereotypes like these may
put women in positions that are less paid or valued [38,41].
The Kosovar government thus imposed a ‘special’ status
for women under the Law on Labour in article 44 to improve
the protection of women employees and decrease hiring
discrimination. However, “the same Law has negative ef-
fects on women as it predicts maternity leave at 70% of the
average salary in Kosovo for the first six months, paid by
the employer, and 50% of the average salary in Kosovo for
the remaining three months, paid by the government” ([38],
p. 104).
Whatever reasons employers may have for preferring
men to women in the work force, it limits women and girls
from being employed and thus gaining financial indepen-
dence. On the up side, a participant from Pristina stated that
an awareness raising campaign on sexist language is set
up that seems to have positive effects. Change is slow in
Kosovo and, sometimes, such small steps are the way to go.
5.1.3. Drug-related insecurities
Insecurities surrounding addictive substances are divided
into two aspects: (ab)use and dealing. It is difficult to
gain comprehensive insight in the extent of drug (ab)use in
Kosovo. Although many organisations in Kosovo collect in-
formation on drugs, there are no official statistics available
that show representative results [42,43]. The European
School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ES-
PAD) studied alcohol, cigarette and drug use among 15 and
16-year-olds in 2011 and shows that Kosovar substance
use was among the lowest in their study [44]. Especially
alcohol use in Kosovo was much lower than in other Euro-
pean countries. The Kosovo Centre for Security Studies
addressed the citizens’ perceived security threat posed by
drugs in the first (2012) [45] and fourth (2014) [46] edition
of the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB). Although over 80
percent of respondents indicated that they perceived drugs
and alcohol as a high risk to societal security (the highest
percentage of the listed internal risks, followed by ‘thefts
and murder’ and ‘illegal weapons’) in the first edition of the
KSB [45], the question was omitted in the following editions.
Threats posed by drugs only came to the fore once more,
in the fourth edition, when posing an open question to iden-
tify main threats according to Kosovo citizens. “Following
the level of unemployment and general economic situation,
the respondents have mentioned [...] other negative phe-
nomena such as criminality, insecurity, thefts and drugs [as
main internal threats to security] ([46], p. 15).” About 10
percent of respondents argued that ‘other negative phenom-
ena’, including drug-related threats, pose the main internal
threats to security in Kosovo [46]. Moreover, the Labyrinth
Centre, an NGO dealing with the prevention and treatment
of drug and alcohol abuse in Kosovo since its founding in
2002, reported that there were only a handful of patients
with drug abuse issues at the University Clinical Centre of
Kosovo in April 2019, and just under twenty addicts were
registered for continuous methadone treatment. The total
number of registered drug users at the Labyrinth Medical-
Psychotherapeutic Centre was 1262 between 2002 and
2019 [47]. Although these data are more recent, they are
not representative, lack a large-scale perspective and can-
not show trends or comparisons, all of which would render
the data more prone to analysis. This shows the impor-
tance of recurrent representative studies on drug (ab)use
in Kosovo [42,43,48].
Finally, statistics provided by the Kosovo Police at re-
quest show strong variations on both the amount of persons
arrested and the amount of drugs confiscated in recent
years. Marihuana is the most commonly confiscated drug,
and there has been a strong increase in confiscated heroin
in 2017, and especially in 2018 and 2019. While these data
may give some insight into the amounts of narcotics flowing
through Kosovo, they do not show if they were meant for do-
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mestic or foreign markets. Especially heroin is transported
along the Balkan route towards markets in Northern and
Western Europe [49,50].
Substance (ab)use came to the fore in five out of nine fo-
cus group discussions and is seen and treated as a serious
insecurity for youth. This girl from Pristina stated “I know
people who use drugs, but I also know people who say:
‘I’m not stupid enough to use drugs!’ So there is a 50-50.
But it is still an issue as long as the other 50% is using it.”
Many respondents argue that a large responsibility for the
prevention and repression of addictive substance (ab)use
lies with parents as well as police.
Ironically, police efforts of preventing addictive sub-
stance (ab)use in school campaigns does not seem to be
followed through when it comes to addressing actual ad-
dictive substance (ab)use and dealing, according to the
participants. Police-school campaigns are one of the in-
tervention methods gleaned from other (Western) contexts.
If they are not followed up with adequate policing on drug
dealing and (ab)use, well-meant school campaigns may
have a counterproductive effect: placing police in a posi-
tion of hypocrisy and giving off the feeling of ticking a box.
Although illegal drug dealing is not visible to some, others
have first-hand experiences with drug dealings taking place
in their neighbourhood. Participants from Mitrovica, Ferizaj
and Prizren describe ‘publicly known’ drug hotspots where
no police intervention takes place. This girl from Mitrovica
states: “I know a boy who sells drugs in front of kids, in
front of people, in front of the police. I know. I have seen it
with my own eyes!” Even when dealers are arrested, they
tend to get back on the street “too soon”, continuing with
“the same things, the same way.” Since Kosovo is part of
the notorious Balkan route for drug smuggle into Western
Europe, it is important to set up an effective network to
stop large-scale drug smuggle and dealing at lower scales
[48,49,51].
Again, most young Kosovars cannot overcome these
insecurities by themselves and rely on police for prevention
talks and intervention. When asked if and why young Koso-
vars take part in drug dealing, a link to unemployment and
the poor financial situation was immediately made: “[They
don’t] sell it for luxury, but they take risks to survive.”
5.1.4. School-related Insecurities
The educational system holds a central role in the lives of
many young Europeans, Kosovars included. Most young-
sters spend large amounts of time on school or university
grounds and school (or college/university)-related insecuri-
ties came to the fore quite often. Four main school-related
insecurities were addressed: (1) violence and bullying in
(and around) schools, (2) poor teaching, (3) nepotism and
(4) a lack of study fields. The latter could be seen as one
of the less pressing issues, referring to the limited variety
of study fields offered at university colleges in Kosovo. Still,
it is yet another reason for youth to leave the country and
wanting to study abroad (see 5.1.1).
Considering the central role of schools (and universities)
in young lives, it is of great importance that the youth’ safety
is ensured there. Nevertheless, many youth experienced
violence in schools, either among students or in the form
of force by school-personnel. Among students, both verbal
and physical violence seems widespread. Many partici-
pants argue that bullying is a poignant issue at their respec-
tive schools, which also continues outside of school grounds.
For some, according to respondents from Pristina, persis-
tent victimisation by bullying can lead to feelings of depres-
sion or anxiety and even suicidal thoughts. These negative
effects also show from literature on bullying [52]. Although
some participants have engaged in so-called anti-bullying
clubs and created movie messages to counter bullying in
their schools, there is a lack of sustainable evidence-based
anti-bullying programs in many middle- or low-income coun-
tries like Kosovo. “Evidence-based anti-bullying programs
are only rarely implemented [...], mostly because their im-
plementation requires extensive amounts of resources that
are not readily available” ([53], p. 73).
Various participants state that they have witnessed
armed fights (i.e. with knifes or even firearms) and some
even noted cases in which a student died on school grounds
after a fight. In Mitrovica, this girl experienced the following:
“In my school there was a case, a student was attacked [...],
the student was shot and killed and this happened right
on the school entrance.” Many students refer to the role
of the police in such extreme fights and opinions vary on
the police’s ability to ensure safe schools. This girl from
Pristina, for example, wonders whether the police work ef-
fectively enough: “I remember, after I graduated, there was
a fight in high school and it got pretty bad because two
kids had knives n them and the police came and the fight
was stopped [...]. Something like that would happen. And
then, a year later, there was a shooting on high school
grounds and a boy died. [...] That makes you think, how
are the police working to keep us safe?” In regards, many
schools and universities have engaged either police or pri-
vate security guards for surveillance on school grounds.
There were also cases noted in which a somewhat more
pro-active resolution was employed: some students are
searched (for weapons, drugs, and other unwanted goods)
before entering school grounds.
The use of force by school-personnel surfaced less often
during the focus group discussions, but is important to note,
nonetheless. A girl from Pristina, for example, describes the
following scene: “A school principal removed a girl’s hijab
forcefully in front of all of the students, you know, in order to
do something like this you would have to be conscienceless”
(see 5.1.6). However, students usually seem to refrain from
reporting misconduct, according to this boy from Mitrovica:
“Most students are hesitant in expressing their problems. I
am in the position of chairman of parliament and still no stu-
dent has reported a professor for misconduct even though
I know there a lot of cases.” There seems to be a need
for more supervision of school-personnel in this regard.
Moreover, teachers tend to dismiss students who for some
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reason are deemed troublesome in class. Kosovar students
often land on the streets when dismissed from class, in-
stead of staying on school grounds. Respondents argued
that this could put them in dangerous situations, depending
on the age and background of the student.
Another identified difficulty related to schools lies with
its teaching. Some youth complained about the poor qual-
ity of teaching from old-fashioned teachers: “[The student]
feels tired, because for seven hours [...], [the student] has
a communist teacher who does not know anything. Who,
for 30 years, has [had] the same notes [...] and says ‘take
the pen and write!’. [A teacher] who does not [include]
anything interactive [...].” Some (formal) efforts have been
made to shift the traditional educational culture in Kosovo to,
for example, learner-centred education [54,55]. However,
change is often resisted by educational leaders, and – as
noted by respondents – teachers. “Transitioning from under-
standing to implementation should be supported vis-à-vis
an educational culture that embraces this new philosophy
as a precondition to successful change of teacher beliefs
and practices” ([53], p. 60).
Furthermore, when it comes to teaching, the Albanian-
Serbian tension in the North of Kosovo leads to gaps be-
tween the educational curricula. This Albanian-Kosovar
boy from Mitrovica argued how some Serb students were
taught misleading information in school: “During the contact
I had with some Serbs, I noticed [...] that they are wrongly
informed. Either it is information they have learned by mis-
take or they have been brainwashed by the media and their
educational system. They think that, during the war, about
13 thousand Serbs were killed [56], which, in my opinion,
is very untrue, because the majority who suffered loss and
damage during the war were Albanians. [...].” The ethni-
cal conflicts between Albanian and Serbian Kosovars has
left its mark on the educational system. During the rising
ethnical tensions in the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians estab-
lished an underground parallel schooling-system as [54] “a
reaction to the Serbian government’s measures demand-
ing that only the Serbian language and history be taught
in public schools.” Even today, a parallel system remains.
This time, however, Serb communities reject the integration
of their educational system into the mainstream Kosovar
educational system. Although educational reform is one of
the key priorities of the Kosovar government (“to promote
[a] democratic and multi-ethnic society”), integrating the eth-
nically defined school-systems of both sides has not been
treated as a high priority ([57], p. 91). This is of great con-
cern, as (higher) education is seen as a crucial component
of political transformation, contributing significantly to the
peace and reconciliation process [56].
Finally, the widespread power relations surrounding
nepotism are also found in the educational system: whether
it is about getting into certain universities or about bargain-
ing for better grades, family (or friends) in higher places
are valuable social capital in the educational career too. In
Prizren, “if you do not have family [or anyone familiar] inside,
or know people, you can’t be registered in university”, a girl
stated. A girl from Mitrovica also describes how connec-
tions seem more important than skill, as she addresses the
prevalence of nepotism in high schools and universities as
follows: “I have seen someone hand in a blank paper with
no answers during the entrance exam and then they are first
on the acceptance list. No one can convince me that that
person deserved a place in the university, because I know
in high school they barely graduated. In every institution it’s
obvious there is nepotism.” It is no wonder that many argue
that nepotism, like corruption, is everywhere in Kosovo.
5.1.5. Physical Dangers
Physical dangers belong to insecurities with which police
and parallel security providers in Kosovo are most directly
concerned with: and there are a lot. In general, it can be
said that physical insecurities are strongly represented not
just by being unsafe, but also by feeling unsafe. Five identi-
fied insecurities were linked to physical dangers, whether
it be merely feeling unsafe or actually being unsafe: (1)
dangerous traffic, (2) (violent) property crime, (3) attacks or
abuse (e.g. due to ethnical conflicts), (4) homicide and (5)
gender-based violence.
First of all, the dangerous traffic poses a risk to both
young and old Kosovars, noted participants. There seems
to be low law abidance when it comes to traffic rules and
driving in the Balkans [58]: “Burim Krasniqi from the Min-
istry of Infrastructure believes that stricter law enforcement
by police is overdue and can help to reduce the number
of accidents.” Police data from 2013 to 2019 show that
there were between 110 and 129 road deaths annually [59].
This roughly amounts to seven road deaths per 100.000
residents. Although the amount of traffic tickets issued in
2019 increased as opposed to the previous year (+ 11.09),
the amount of traffic accidents also rose (+ 2.17%). De-
spite “great efforts to increase safety in road traffic” from the
Kosovo Police, the amount of (fatal) accidents remains prob-
lematic. There are several international handbooks on road
safety, but [60]: “local [road traffic] experts have to assess
if and how results from these studies can be transferred to
their own settings.” In Kosovo, effective road engineering
can be challenging due to limited resources and a lack of
data and information for road improvement [61].
Secondly, (violent) property crime such as burglaries
and robberies stem from the poor economic situation and
tight job market in Kosovo, according to the participants.
There is a strong presence of organised crime gangs, which
may have a part in robberies too, however, gang activities
were not discussed in any of our focus groups. Only a few
participants identified such dangers as insecurities, and
only a few actually experienced them. According to data
from the United National Office on Drugs and Crime (UN-
ODC), Kosovo ranks low compared to many other European
countries when it comes to reported property crimes [62,63].
In 2018, the rates per 100,000 inhabitants were 256.81 for
burglaries, 324.37 for theft and 11.95 for car theft. The most
recent available rate for robberies in Kosovo lies at 17.21
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in 2017. It must be noted, however, that these data rely on
reported cases to police, which is not as common in Kosovo
as it may be in other European countries.
The UNODC data on serious assault show a similarly
low ranking for Kosovo in the European region (rate of 16.98
per 100,000 in 2018) [61,62]. Nevertheless, respondents
emphasized the fear of attacks or abuse multiple times
(which, of course, need not be serious assault cases or may
not be reported to police (as such)). Some youth described
that, at times, they even fear for their lives due to aggres-
sion of other individuals. The homicide rate in Kosovo was
among the highest in the other former Yugoslavian states
shortly after Kosovo declared its independence, but has
gone down considerably in recent years [64]. Having wit-
nessed violence and even killings on school campuses (see
5.1.4), it is not surprising that many young Kosovars carry
this fear with them. The threats do not come from peers
only, “I know many cases from my colleagues [including
himself, ed.], who have asked questions to the prime minis-
ter and have been threatened with life”, a boy from Pristina
said. This poor environment for critical feedback shows how
toxic the relationship between youth and their government
is. Next to numerous fights taking place on school grounds
(see 5.1.4), participants identified two groups who are ar-
gued to cause fights and at times attack others: mentally
instable individuals in Ferizaj and Serbian troublemakers
in Mitrovica. The first is addressed below and the latter is
addressed in the next section (see 5.1.6).
In Shtime, a small village near Ferizaj, Kosovo’s largest
mental health facility is located. “The facility is [too] small
and not able to house all the people who need help and
so some of them end up on the streets. Some of them
are violent and cause problems,” youth stated. Back in
2002, a UN mission representative already “admitted that
conditions at Kosovo’s largest mental hospital, the 285-bed
unit at Shtime, south of Pristina, were particularly bad” [65].
Youth have reported, “In our town square, there a lot of peo-
ple with mental disabilities that walk around, and when I go
past my school I get scared, I have to change my direction
because it’s not safe.” International interventions for men-
tal health were initiated to help address the psychological
blows the recent Balkan conflicts took on their people, but
have not been able to solve all deficits [66,67]. Although
problems surrounding mental health in Kosovo are studied
to some extent (for example, [65,66,68]), studies showing
the problematics for those living near overcrowded mental
health institutes are lacking.
Finally, youth describe certain physical dangers to be
more prone to women than to men. Kosovar women and
girls are victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence
more often than males [69], as is the case in many coun-
tries. Kosovo ranks highest in the UNODC data for South-
Europe on reported sexual violence (24.7) and sexual ex-
ploitation (15.5) rates per 100,000 inhabitants, but these
rates lie below those of many Northern and Western Eu-
ropean countries [61,62]. It would be inaccurate, however,
to conclude that sexual violence and exploitation is thus
simply less apparent in Kosovo. Previous research has
pointed out that many women do not report cases of sexual
abuse to police. Stigmatization of victims of sexual abuse
keeps them from reporting and also makes finding justice
particularly difficult [70,71]. Respondents pointed out that
even when cases are reported, they are not always taken
seriously. According to this girl from Ferizaj: “The police
are active and working only when it’s very serious, when
something very bad has happened. For example, when I
have issues with the boys in my class, or even when I am
harassed in the street, I report the incident and they do not
do anything. Even though it bothers me very much. You
cannot find a solution with the police, even though that is
where you are supposed to find solutions.”
Kosovo is taking formal steps towards addressing
gender-based violence (e.g. the adoption of a reparations
law for wartime sexual and gender-based violence [72],
launching of integrated database on cases of gender-based
violence and recognizing domestic violence as a stand-
alone criminal offence [73]; all in 2018). However ([72],
p. 28), beside the aforementioned, “there are concerns
about lenient sentencing in cases of gender-based violence.
Sustainable funding for shelters for victims of gender-based
violence and trafficking in human beings has still not been
ensured. Measures need to be taken for the effective rein-
tegration of victims.”
5.1.6. Ethnical and Religious Tension
The most prevalent and deeply rooted tensions in Kosovo re-
main based on ethnicity – intertwined with religion to some
extent. Albanians and Serbs who once lived peacefully as
neighbours turned to archenemies during and after the col-
lapse of Yugoslavia. Nationalism sprung in the Balkans and,
while leaping into a large-scale civil war, one after another
separated from Yugoslavia. Kosovo, which had been part
of Serbia, sought independence in 2008. Many Albanians
see the Serbs as the main aggressors in the conflict, while
Serbs blame Albanians for annexing land considered theirs.
Therefore, there is an ever-present tension between the
Albanian majority in Kosovo and the Serbian minority clus-
tered mainly in the North. This has put especially young
Kosovars in an identity crisis, be it in different ways.
“Apart from diverging nationalist aspirations, ethnic dif-
ferences between the groups also coincide with language
and religious differences ([74], p. 4).” Language and culture
are at the core of Albanian ethnic identity forming, sur-
passing religious identity. Previous studies have suggest
that religion is more important for Serbs, although religious
identity may not serve the same way in today’s society [73].
Results from our focus groups indicate that language
may have gained emphasis in Serb identity forming and their
identifying of out-groups in Kosovo. An Albanian-Kosovar
respondent took “watch your language” to a whole new level,
stating: “When we go there [North-Mitrovica with Serb ma-
jority], we barely speak Albanian, because if they hear you
speaking...”. Language is a way in which ‘troublemakers’
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(be it Serb or Albanian) identify their in-group and potential
targets from the out-group. Moreover, participants from
Prizren spoke about conflicts between the Turkish (speak-
ing) population and the Albanian speaking majority. This
girl, however, seems to have found that socializing and com-
munication is key in resolving these insecurities. “I have
some friends that speak Turkish [...], most of the time we
communicate in Turkish [...]. When I said a Turkish word,
[others] were swearing ‘why are you speaking Turkish?’ [...].
But now, they are used to us, and are more curious to learn
something new, and by socializing with them I think this
problem can be resolved.” Although Turks and Albanians
do not share the same conflict as Albanians and Serbs
do, this resolution does show promise. Under the right
conditions, similar contact between peers may be benefi-
cial to strengthening the relationship between Serbs and
Albanians too (contact hypothesis [75]) [73,76].
Although the majority of the Kosovar society is Muslim
(95.6% according to the Kosovo Census which was boy-
cotted by many Serbs [77] 88% according to the European
Social Survey [78] religion is not generally seen as a core
part of the Albanian identity [73]. This sometimes leads to
situations like this: “One day a man was looking weirdly
at me and was walking towards me, I think he wanted to
remove my hijab but I quickly left.” The same issue arose
in schools where participants were not allowed to wear a
headscarf until recently. Even though there is a Muslim ma-
jority in the Kosovar population, wearing affiliated clothing
is sometimes frowned upon, as it does not fit the moder-
ate religious environment. In Kosovo, religion is a private
matter and bears much less importance than ethnicity (i.e.
Albanian versus Serb) [73,79]. At the same time, however,
religious radicalization has become a hot topic in Kosovo
since many young Kosovars left for Syria [80]. Multiple
recent studies explore the parallelism between relative sec-
ularity and radicalization in Kosovo (for example, [79,81,82].
Despite this, religious radicalization did not come the fore
in our focus groups and is thus not explored here.
Albanian youth in Mitrovica are particularly concerned
with Serb ‘troublemakers’ who mainly roam the Northern
part of the city. A boy from Mitrovica argues that the
Albanian-Serb tension sometimes lead to (feelings of) un-
safety, “because we cannot move there [North-Mitrovica]
freely. [...] Because there are [Serbian] gangsters and
people brought there to make trouble.” Youth also describe
seemingly random attacks by Serbs when crossing the main
bridge. In turn, Serb youth stated that they were bullied by
their Albanian peers. For example, a Serbian girl stated,
“Some Muslim kids back in the high school were bullying me
because of my nationality. We were fighting often [...].”
Nevertheless, there is some sympathy from Albanian
Kosovars for their Serb peers: “Not all the Serbs [are trou-
blemakers], because they are also like us: they want to
work, they want to have good conditions to live in,” this
boy from Mitrovica insists. Serb participants indeed noted
concerns revolving unemployment, as well as multiple phys-
ical and school-related insecurities that are similar to those
experienced by the Albanian population.
The Ibar River that divides the city into its infamous
Northern (Serbian) and Southern (Albanian) sides sym-
bolically underline the ethnical division in Mitrovica – and
Kosovo. This division is even visible in the local police force
(see 5.2.2).
In order to better the relationship between Serbs and
Albanians in Kosovo, the political environment needs to
become more inclusive. International resolution efforts had
some formal success (e.g. “The First Agreement of Princi-
ples Governing the Normalization of Relations”, established
in 2013), but real reconciliation seems far away. “Every time
conflicts are mentioned, we immediately go to the [relation-
ship] between Serbs and Albanians. [...] The only thing that
makes us feel unsafe [...] is the politics. Because earlier
Albanians and Serbs got along very well, but now, politics
have separated them. Politics are creating this unsafety,” a
respondent from Mitrovica argued. Political normalization is
needed to re-establish harmonious relationships between
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Moreover, insecurities
(e.g. described in this study) need to be addressed ([75],
p. 100-101): “Reconciliation goes beyond conflict resolution
and addresses the social and emotional barriers to improve
ethnic relations. In this context, peace negotiations influ-
ence ethnic relations and consequently identity formation
process. [...]. There is a lack of political will to build an
identity that goes beyond ethno-national affiliation.”
5.2. Part II: Attitudes towards Police
The international community (notably the OSCE, UN, EU
and individual foreign states) has influenced and guided
peace building and security sector reform in the Western
Balkans shortly before, during and after the Yugoslavian
conflicts. Over the years, the direction of these reforms have
fluctuated, sometimes resulting in paradoxical approaches
and goals – hampering effectivity [83].
During the intervention phase, creating a trustworthy
and accountable police stood in focus, because “policing in
socialist systems was oppressive and not citizen-oriented”;
and, “police had lost its role as a defender of law and order
and instead become a tool for conflict and war” ([82], p. 461-
462). Next to international monitoring and accountability
mechanisms, the EU aimed to make police more responsive
to citizens (i.e. shift from force to service), e.g. by making
the composition of the police more representative. However
([82], p. 463), “in order to recruit minorities into the police
they would need to return to the area. Yet, their return is
hampered by the lack of confidence that the police would
be able to guarantee their safety.”
After Kosovo declared independence and a new police
force was established, a division remained between Serb
and Albanian officers (see Par I 5.1.6 and Part II 5.2.2).
The intervention reforms did not change attitudes of police
officials nor the political culture. “Concerns about the real
‘human security’ situation for individuals on the ground, in
particular vulnerable groups [...] remained” ([82], p. 464).
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Moreover, a main concern regarding international po-
lice reforms in the Western Balkans is the way in which
foreign forces seem to impose reforms, lacking (sufficient)
consideration of local experiences with police and other
state-led security forces, as well as insufficient support of
local elites [84]. Sustainable development in these areas
must be supported by political commitment of domestic ac-
tors. In Kosovo in particular, there was a lack of security in
the immediate aftermath of the NATO interception in 1999.
This may not only have given way to criminal groups taking
hold, but also ([83], p. 17) “shaped relations between Alba-
nians and Serbs until today, created the enclave structure
into which Serbs withdrew and undermined trust of Serbs
and other minorities in the effective security provision and
guarantees by NATO and other international organizations.”
Whether or not the efforts for a trustworthy, accountable,
ethnically diverse policing body show from youth’ ATP, re-
mains questionable. The ATP voiced by the participants
are analysed and categorised alongside three perspectives:
performance-based, the distributive justice and the procedu-
ral justice. The latter is divided into friendliness, neutrality,
participation potential and trustworthiness.
5.2.1. Performance-based perspective
Topics surrounding police were discussed thoroughly in the
focus groups. From a performance-based perspective, par-
ticipants generally argue that police do not “do their job”
nor provide a feeling of safety, as noted previously (see
5.1.5). Part of these negative opinions are formed by ex-
periences of ineffective police interventions and prevention
of fights among students at schools (see 5.1.4). Another
performance-based perspective that affects ATP is related
to their responses to emergency calls. In some cases, re-
sponse speeds were satisfactory. The general tendency,
however, is that police are “always late” or even unreach-
able by phone. For example, “On the town square, one was
stabbing another with a knife. We all saw it and called the
police, but they did not answer. [...]. We all saw it, women
crying, children; nothing!” Multiple participants had experi-
enced or heard of similar cases at which no one answered
the emergency hotline.
Furthermore, police performance is negatively affected
by miscommunications and misunderstandings in arrests:
“We had a case with our neighbours. The police came
to their house several times claiming someone had done
something illegal but they had mistaken the person and
there were always misunderstandings, this didn’t happen
once but a number of times, and they always convicted
the wrong person. This is absurd!” The reason for these
mix-ups remain unknown to the respondents.
Finally, in almost all focus group discussions, young
Kosovars voiced the feeling that police are not capable or
motivated to investigate cases and help citizens with their
troubles. Some examples of lacking investigation and help
from police were noted in previously. In short, “people al-
ways say ‘hope no one will need them [ed. the police]’ [...].
This makes you suspect that they will not help you if you
need them. And often, we hear cases when citizens do not
report problems at the police station, because they know
that the police won’t help and will only waste their time.”
Police’s poor (motivation for) investigation thus keeps resi-
dents from engaging police for emergencies and reporting
offenses. “My friend had a fight and when he wanted to
report it to the police, a police officer said ‘Do not report it,
because it is not worth it. No one will take care of it.”, a girl
from Prizren explained.
Concluding, many factors cause youth to view police per-
formance as poor. However, many see internal aspects of
the Kosovar police as limiting and thus causing poor perfor-
mance to some extent. On the one hand, youth argue that
“maybe, they [ed. the police] did not want to risk their lives,
but it is somewhat absurd. Perhaps this is a result of low
salaries. Why risk your life for 200 or 300 euros?” These
low salaries in combination with poor health insurance may
not be the best motivation for police officers to intervene
in potentially dangerous situations. Moreover, participants
pointed out that police are often “old” and “old-fashioned”,
potentially limiting effective performance: “I think the police
should be ‘in’ with the 21st century. But somehow they are
still in the last century. One case happened to a person I
know, thieves entered his home and stole an iPad or some-
thing. Police came, pretended they were doing something,
looking at the window. They did not know how to find the
thief. This person had the “find my iPhone” app on the
phone [...]. When he told the police about this they were
like ‘How did you do this?’ They were surprised”.
5.2.2. Distributive justice perspective
When inspecting the discussions on ATP with a distributive
justice perspective, four characteristics were distilled: (1)
police treat people with power differently, (2) youth calls are
not taken seriously and (3) police do not go everywhere due
to ethnical tensions. The power relations in Kosovo have
surfaced multiple times in the focus group discussions as
they do here: “For example, the traffic fines, if they see a
simple person, they give them a fee, and if it is someone
with power, authority, they cannot even stop them nor give
them a fine.”, a girl from Pristina says.
Moreover, emergency calls or reporting from young
Kosovars are sometimes not taken seriously. This leads
many to utilize different mechanisms for problem resolution
(i.e. resorting to family members): “If we feel insecure we
just call our family members. There is no hope for the police
because if he [ed. the police officer] sees you: ‘Oh it has to
be your fault because you’re young. You don’t know all the
rules’ or something.”
The ethnical tension and affiliated police division by
ethnicity leads to unequal distribution of police forces in
Mitrovica. Albanian police officers work in the South and
Serbian police officers are employed in the North, backed
by international forces such as the NATO-led peacekeeping
Kosovo Force (KFOR). Youth voiced their concerns, arguing
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“KFOR isn’t going to stay here forever, neither is the interna-
tional police. Then we’ll be left with these policemen who
have never actually, maybe, been on the northern side. You
have to know what you’re doing.” Local police forces stand
before the challenge of being able to ensure the security
of all residents of Mitrovica before the international police
forces withdraw. Withdrawal issues are not just a problem
for international police forces, but for many other internation-
ally led initiatives and projects dependent on foreign donors
as well. Also, research suggests that “the often intrusive
approach of external actors in domestic security provision
can certainly be seen as being benign in intent, but it can
also undermine not just citizen trust in the state which is
instead placed in external security providers. It also creates
new power-relations which links citizens to external actors”
([83], p. 17-18).
Sometimes police – those who should provide (a feeling
of) security – have a counterproductive effect on youth’s
perspectives of security. Increased police activity in Mitro-
vica can strengthen (feelings of) unsafety: “There is the
bridge, and there is police all over. And sometimes when
there is a fight or a protest, the police gets doubled and
there is like these huge tanks protecting the, you know,
“border”, [...]. You don’t feel safe when you see the people
with machine guns in the patrol and the police. You cannot
feel safe.” Other participants describe that, due to a lack
of trust in the police and a general mentality arguing that
police are only there when “something bad has happened”,
police presence does not necessarily provide (a feeling of)
security.
5.2.3. Procedural justice perspective
The procedural justice perspective regarding police forces
in Kosovo is analysed alongside four sub-sections. First of
all, although some youth noted polite and understanding
behaviour of police, others addressed harsh and arrogant
behaviour by police. In part, youth argued that police some-
times use harsh behaviour and force to “scare” others and
keep them from making the same mistakes. To some ex-
tent, this hinders the development of a healthy relationship
between police and communities and gives way to fear: “In
most cases we are a little afraid, because when you get
closer they have angry look, and a voice sound like they
are going to shout at us, for something not important.”
The limited neutrality of police is strongly affected by the
power relations at place. In general, Kosovar youth views
police as corrupt and subject to nepotism: “In Kosovo, you
just tell them whose son or daughter you are, or that you
know someone [...], and then easily you can corrupt them
[ed. the police] with money too.” A girl from Mitrovica expe-
rienced this firsthand when she got stopped for a speeding
and was allowed to drive off without a ticket because the po-
lice officer recognized her last name and appeared to know
her grandfather. Once again, these statements indicate
how widespread corruption and nepotism are in Kosovo.
Regarding participation potential, the general tendency
is – again – poor. Although school campaigns and patrols
increase the approachability of police officers according to
the participants, the relationship between youth and police
is generally described as poor. The fact that many Kosovars
do not know the emergency number underlines this distant
relationship. This girl from Pristina states, “I think the re-
lationship between the police and the people is basically
non-existent here. A couple of months back, [...] journal-
ists would go on the streets and they were asking people:
‘What’s the police number here in Kosovo?’ [...]. And more
than half didn’t even know the number. [...]. That’s how
much we use the number; so that we don’t even know the
number.” The emergency number in Kosovo has changed
over the years and seems to have caused confusion: it was
092 during the Yugoslavian regime, 112 after the Kosovo
war ended and 192 since the declaration of independence
in 2008. All in all, there are steps to be taken in order to
improve response calls. There is a wish among the respon-
dents for more communication and cooperation with youth
and more transparent information sharing from the police
to improve the participation potential.
Finally, only one participant (from Mitrovica) voiced that
he trusts both the international and local police. All others
deemed the police, like many other Kosovar institutions,
untrustworthy in general. Many participants stated that they
trust international police forces such as KFOR more than lo-
cal police, because the assume them to be less “influenced”
by, for example, corruption. Also “KFOR [...] are considered
higher rank than the [local] police and I think they helped
reduce some problems that were apparent here,” according
to our participants. The friendliness of KFOR officers also
improved trust in KFOR among some of our participants.
All other statements regarding trust in both local and in-
ternational police were performance-based as previously
described (see 5.2.1). In short, this means, “if I heard more
cases that the police succeeded and they’d done their job
then I’d be more trustful. But that’s not the case.”
6. Conclusion and Discussion
This study aimed to give Kosovar youth a voice and put the
human in human security. “As reflexive beings capable of
computing complex security dilemmas and active agents
in the construction of safer environments, individuals can
thus reclaim their rightful place in a person-centred concept
of security” ([16], p. 582). In Part I, insecurities and reso-
lution mechanisms (i.e. agency) of young Kosovars were
analysed. Part II addressed perceptions and importance on
performance, the procedural justice and the distributive jus-
tice of police in Kosovo. Primary data from semi-structured
focus group discussions with Kosovar youth were used to
explore a large scope of insecurities when growing up in
post-conflict Kosovo.
Four main insecurities were identified in Part I: (1)
job-related (including job-related discrimination), (2) drug-
related, (3) school-related, (4) physical insecurities. Both
Serb and Albanian focus groups identified similar insecu-
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rities in their everyday-lives. Ethnic and religious tensions
were a recurrent crosscutting theme, related to most of the
aforementioned insecurities. However, many of the identi-
fied insecurities are also interconnected and seem to spring
from the weak economic status of Kosovo. Also, both actual
and perceived insecurity are relevant to human security of
individuals. This became especially clear when addressing
physical dangers: many feared physical dangers, but only a
few experienced them. This can be caused by an exagger-
ated perception of crime rates or by successful avoidance
mechanisms – or both. One respondent concluded: “I would
say that there are other insecurities [...] and these [...] may
be much more difficult than physical ones.”
Any peace-making efforts should therefore take the so-
cial and economic context in Kosovo into account when
addressing human security. Furthermore, there seems
to be a discrepancy between the many action plans and
handbooks (formal change) on the one hand, and effective
implementation on the other (actual change). Benchmarks
of international missions (such as EULEX) are often exclu-
sively quantitative, although many aspects of peace and
security cannot be measured that way. “It is important to
assess missions not as box-ticking exercises, but rather
carefully consider the extent to which effectiveness criteria
are met” ([85], p. 600).
Moreover, this study suggests that language has gained
importance in establishing out-groups and (thus) identity,
especially for Kosovar-Serbs whose identity has previously
been argued to find its core in religion, rather than language
[73]. A similar language division was observed between
Albanian (for whom language and culture are core) and
Turkish youth. Here, frequent contact in and around school
helped to improve relations between both groups, conform
to Allport’s contact hypothesis [74]. Future research could
explore if and under what circumstances this may apply to
the relation between young Albanians and Serbs.
Similar to the findings of Kostovicova et al. [16], youth
may employ small-scale resolutions, but are unable to
change the large-scale problems in Kosovo. Here too, a
paradox exists between the insecurities experienced by
youth and their agency to change it. For example, youth
named nepotism and corruption as something that causes
insecurity to them. To cope with the consequences this
has for, for example, finding a job, they too (have to) use
corruption and nepotism to their advantage. This develops
a vicious circle. Young Kosovars were often unable to re-
solve insecurities directly and individually. Most problem
resolution revolved around avoidance and withdrawal on the
one hand (i.e. self-reliance), and initiatives from peers and
family (i.e. informality & community solidarity) on the other.
To many, the ultimate resolution mechanism is emigration
into EU states for work and/or studying, which showed from
the mass emigration movement, which took place in 2015.
Many feel like “there is nothing here”.
Both local and international police in the region are
supposed to ensure the security of Kosovar youth and all
other residents. Some of the identified insecurities, like
unemployment, are difficult and/or not suiting for police to
address. However, as addressed in Part II of this study,
there is still much to be done if police aim to really be (seen
as) a helping hand when it comes the resolution of inse-
curities in which the police do play a role (e.g. physical
dangers). Most arguments for youth’ ATP seem to spring
from the performance-based perspective and procedural
justice perspective as described in the theoretical frame-
work, respectively. It indicates that youth find those two as-
pects of police most important; however, both aspects are
generally evaluated to be poor. When it comes to trustwor-
thiness of police – part of the procedural justice perspective
– youth merely named performance-based arguments for
their general distrust. Thus, to improve the ATP in gen-
eral, as well as trustworthiness in particular, police need to
perform better when it comes to tackling the multitude of
insecurities young Kosovars experience when growing up in
post-conflict Kosovo. With strong power relations still intact,
this will prove to be a challenge for all. Besides, the future
withdrawal of international resources and forces (such as
KFOR) pose a challenge of their own.
This study looked at the individual stories of Kosovar
youth, which had to rely on snowball sampling in order to
reach out to respondents. Further randomized quantitative
research is needed to be able see to what extent these
insecurities and perspectives are felt on a larger scale. Diffi-
culties lie with forming a representative sample, since many
Serbian-Kosovars tend to boycott surveys and studies in
Kosovo. For this reason, however, it may be even more
interesting to look at the perspectives of Serbian-Kosovar
in a more in-depth study. Future research can also in-
vestigate (hiring) discrimination on the basis of political
preference and problems connected to overloaded mental
health centres in, for example, communities surrounding
Shtime. Moreover, there is a dire need for a long-term,
representative study on drug (ab)use in Kosovo.
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